When Liaoning exercised at the South China Sea

In the last two weeks, it came to the attention that China’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning exercised at the South China Sea. The US Navy has been keeping a close look, monitoring its activities.

Not the first time?

Technically speaking, this is not the first time that Liaoning exercised at the South China Sea. Liaoning travelled between naval bases in Dalian and Hainan occasionally in the last 7 years. It first appeared in the South China Sea back in 2013. Last year, Liaoning conducted a cross-region exercise. It navigated in the East China Sea, passed the Miyako and Taiwan Straits, then entered the South China Sea for a routine exercise.

Admittedly, Liaoning has become a frequent visitor in the South China Sea in recent months. This was the third time of this year that it exercised at the South China Sea. Claiming that they were only normal naval exercise (the Chinese Navy usually began its training cycle sometimes after the Chinese New Year and Spring), these exercises do indicate somethings regarding China’s naval power.

Is this concerning?

China’s naval power is indeed growing. For many years, China struggled to expand its maritime power beyond the first island chain. The Gulf of Aden escort missions show that China could travel in the far ocean. However, if China wants to become a dominant regional sea power, it needs to acquire for the anti-access/denial capability. Now, the Chinese Navy is more confident to let Liaoning traveling into the deep sea. It is more dedicated to acquire the capacity of an aircraft carrier battlegroup. This is one step closer to a blue-water navy.

However, many Chinese strategists also point out that China would never want the South China Sea to be a flashpoint in the region. I am sure that Beijing is fully aware of the consequence of China developing its sea power. Therefore, to Chinese policymakers, the focus has been how to sustain a peaceful strategic environment, especially with the US navy, while increasing its normal naval exercises in the South China Sea. Though I am skeptical about this perspective. The US has expressed its concern, framing China’s activities as “militarisation of the South China Sea”.

What will happen next?

As a Chinese watcher, China’s naval capability has not always been my greatest concern of its growing sea power. China’s growing naval power is only a part of its sea power construction. And due to the lack of war in the contemporary era, the navy could hardly become the most dominant and prominent force of Chinese maritime power. This is also why China is developing other kinds of sea power.

Indeed, Beijing and Washington will continue to compete in the South China Sea — one of the chokepoints of global trade route. Liaoning exercising at the South China Sea will become normal, so does US navy monitoring activities. However, the navy is only part of their competition. There will be more tensions in other maritime policies. This is how maritime power competition turns from a warfare into a lawfare.