China’s maritime power in the 14th Five-Year Plan

The 2021 “lianghui” was concluded last week in Beijing. The final version of the 14th Five-Year Plan (FYP) has just came out. For those who are not familiar with Chinese politics, the FYP is an indicative official document that illustrates China’s national objectives in the next five years. This is the second FYP under Xi Jinping’s administration. It is also the second time that the goal of “constructing a strong maritime power” (建设海洋强国) is mentioned in a FYP. Like five years ago, Beijing spends a whole chapter discussing about its maritime political objectives. Indeed, the objectives for China’s maritime power construction are clearer and more ambitious this time.

Growing proactiveness

Similar to the 13th FYP, The phrase of “constructing a strong maritime power” appears in the middle of the FYP  in Chapter 33, titled “actively expand the space for marine economic development” (积极拓展海洋经济海洋空间). It means that the approach of China’s maritime power construction remains the same. Unsurprisingly, it focuses on the maritime economy. In fact, the Chinese government never associates it with naval modernisation. It always claims to become a strong sea power with a powerful blue economy. The navy is the support of the overall maritime power development.

However, compared with the previous FYP, Beijing adds the word “active” (积极) in the title of the chapter. It also includes the word “speed up” (加快) in front of the goal of “constructing a strong maritime power”. In fact, we could sense such proactiveness throughout the chapter. For example,  “participating international and regional maritime orders” (参与国际和地区海洋秩序) has shifted to “promoting the construction of a fair and reasonable international maritime order” (推动建设公正合理的国际海洋秩序). “Formulating a maritime basic law” (制定海洋基本法) has shifted to “advancing the legislation of the maritime basic law in an orderly manner” (有序推进海洋基本法立法). Such narrative hint that China will increase its proactiveness in maritime affairs, both internally and externally.

Emphasis on ocean governance

So, how China’s maritime power construction is going to be proactive? Incidentally, the section on “safeguarding maritime rights and interests” (维护海洋权益) in the 13th FYP is replaced by “deeply participating in global ocean governance” (深度参与全球海洋治理). This is an interesting shift. “Maritime rights and interests” has been a catchy phrase in Chinese maritime politics. The phrase is usually associated with “maritime territorial integrity” (领海/土主权) . However, it has a more expanded meaning. It refers to China’s rights to access the sea. This includes resource exploitation, scientific research, sea lane safety, and, most importantly, overseas interests.

For a long period of time, Beijing’s approach towards maritime rights and interests has been defensive. It emphasises that these rights need to be “safeguarded” than “developed”. In 2016, it did mentioned about the desire of “developing” national maritime rights by all means, but the strategy was unclear. The discussion was about strengthening law enforcement bodies, researching on territorial and legal issues, and the need to improve the maritime strategy. The national government understood the limitation of the lack of effective strategy in ocean governance. Indeed, we do find China has been taking reforms and restructures for its domestic maritime law enforcement agencies over the last five years.

“Fair” international maritime order

Policies becomes more precise in the 14th FYP. Rather than defending its maritime rights and interests, Beijing is dedicated to creating a “fair” (公平) and “reasonable” (合理) international maritime order, as well as constructing “maritime community of destiny” (海洋命运共同体). This objective aligns with the grand political narratives in China. That is, to establish an international environment more favourable for China’s national interests.

In the context of sea power development, this does not necessary means that China will increase contribution in ocean governance. It also does not mean that Beijing is going to abandon its interests in maritime territorial integrity. Instead, through participating in global ocean governance, China could be more vocal in several maritime issues to ensure its maritime rights and interests can be protected. This, undoubtedly, includes territorial interests.

Maritime cooperation

The 14th FYP also includes more discussion on maritime cooperation with other states. This is indeed related to the aspiration of ocean governance. However, if we read closely, those suggested activities are rather less dispute-related. Most of them have been on-going for quite a while. For instance, China has been an active participant in Arctic and Antarctic research. It has developed some protocols or mechanism on environmental protection and search-and-rescue operations with Southeast Asian countries. 

It is quite unfortunate that the FYP does not discuss about law enforcement cooperation in Northern Asia and the Mekong River. I believe such cooperation would be a breakthrough for China’s maritime strategy as a growing sea power. The FYP has taken rather a conservative approach here.

Revisionist or reformist?

It has been almost ten years since constructing a strong sea power becomes a national goal. The rise of China’s maritime power has always been a concern. On the one hand, China claims itself as a different sea power. It is not going to be a maritime hegemon. But at the same time, it attempts to change and establish an international order that is favourable for its own national interests. China is reluctant to be labelled as a “revisionist”, given that the word has negative connotation. It regards itself as a “reformist” of the existing international order, which dominated by the western civilisation.

This brings us back to the elephant in the room: is the existing world order “unfair”, as China proclaims? China will definitely impose more maritime policies that are beyond expectations of the western communities: the use of coastguards, grey-zone operations by maritime militias and fishing fleets, and alternative interpretations of international laws. It is difficult to say China’s action is “illegal” because there are no right or wrong answer in international politics (I am taking a realist approach here indeed).The world cannot ignore China’s understanding of sea power development, whether to follow, resist, or accommodate.